Surging world energy prices, increasing oil market volatility and a nascent 'energy transition' are posing major challenges for global energy governance. In response, there has been a proliferation in the number of multilateral bodies addressing energy issues in recent years, and a wide range of organisations now claim a role in facilitating intergovernmental energy cooperation. However, the practical achievements of these organisations have been very poor, with all suffering difficulties that have limited their ability to promote shared energy interests between states. This article examines the dynamics of multilateral energy organisations, arguing that the political economy features of energysecuritisation and attendant patterns of economic nationalism -explains why they have failed to develop more robust cooperative mechanisms. Ten global-level organisations are evaluated, and found to suffer from either membership, design or commitment issues that limit their effectiveness in global energy governance. These challenges are linked to the securitisation of energy, which has led governments to favour low-cost soft law approaches over potentially more effective hard law institutional designs. Moreover, the securitisation of energy poses limits for how far multilateral energy cooperation can proceed, and means contemporary efforts to strengthen these organisations are unlikely to succeed in coming years.
INTRODUCTION
Energy issues are rising in status on the international economic agenda. Despite shared interests between producing and consuming governments in promoting energy interdependence, recent trends have raised questions over the effectiveness of global energy governance. Soaring world prices for oil, natural gas and coal, increasing levels of volatility in international energy markets, heightened anxieties over supply security, and the need to promote the transition to new energy sources have increased the need for international energy cooperation. Multilateral energy organisations -intergovernmental bodies dedicated to fostering energy cooperation -can play an important role in helping to realise shared interests in the energy sphere. Such organisations can potentially facilitate information sharing, integrate energy markets, address price volatility and help balance the interests of energy producers and consumers. Indeed, recent years have seen a proliferation of multilateral energy organisations, all of which have attempted to facilitate such patterns of intergovernmental cooperation. However, the practical effectiveness of these multilateral organisations has been decidedly poor. They all suffer from some form of institutional difficulty, which has led to the dominance of 'soft law' approaches that significantly limit their effectiveness in promoting energy cooperation between governments.
Why, when energy issues are rising in importance, and intergovernmental cooperation could help realise shared interests, have multilateral energy organisations performed so poorly? This article argues the answer in the political economy features of energy -namely, the securitised nature of energy issues and attendant patterns of economic nationalism. These dynamics raise governments' concerns over energy policy autonomy, prohibit forms of cooperation based on liberalisation, and result in the dominance of soft law designs in energy organisations. To substantiate this argument, a survey of contemporary institutional dynamics in ten multilateral energy organisations is undertaken. This survey reveals that all currently suffer from one of three challenges -membership, design or commitment issues -that reduce their effectiveness in promoting shared energy interests. These challenges can be linked to the securitisation of energy, which has seen major players oppose formal types of cooperation in favour of lower-cost (but less effective) soft law initiatives. Importantly, ongoing patterns of energy securitisation mean that efforts to strengthen these multilateral organisations are arguably unlikely to succeed, and their contribution to global energy governance is likely to remain limited in coming years.
ENERGY INTERDEPENDENCE AND MULTILATERAL COOPERATION
Managing energy interdependence is a pressing issue for many states. All industrialised economies require energy resources -typically coal, oil and gas -to power their electricity, transport and industrial systems. Energy production also makes a major contribution to the economies of hydrocarbon-rich countries, particularly those in the developing world where energy sectors account for large shares of exports, foreign investment and industrial employment. Owing to the arbitrary spread of energy reserves around the globe, production and consumption centres are often located in different nations. This has called forth mutually-beneficial patterns of interdependence between energy producing and consuming economies, which respectively rely on each other for the demand for and supply of energy products.
However, in order to realise shared interests in the energy sphere, some degree of intergovernmental cooperation is required. To enable trade and investment between energyrich and energy-poor economies, it is necessary for governments to develop rules and practices that promote open and transparent world markets. Cooperative strategies to manage volatility are also important, to mitigate the economic risks posed by rapid upward and downward swings in world energy markets. Balancing the interests of energy producers and consumers -with the former generally favouring higher and the latter lower prices -is also essential to avoid distributional conflicts between governments over the gains from energy interdependence.
International organisations can potentially play a significant role in promoting these shared energy interests. At a minimum, energy-oriented international organisations could facilitate information sharing between governments (Dubash & Florini 2011) , and reassure both producers and consumers regarding the policy intentions of other parties (Victor & Yueh 2010) . More ambitiously, they could help integrate global energy markets, by setting standards for national energy policies, lowering transaction costs and reinforcing the transparency of international markets (Goldthau & Witte 2009 ). They may also help address energy market volatility, by providing a forum in which governments can collectively anticipate future market conditions and negotiate energy policies that respond accordingly (Harks 2010) . International organisations could also smooth the transition process toward new energy sources in the face of hydrocarbon depletion and climate change, by encouraging intergovernmental policy coordination for the promotion of renewable and non-traditional energy industries (Lesage et al. 2010) . Given the benefits of energy interdependence for both producers and consumers, intergovernmental cooperating through multilateral energy organisations could potentially make a significant contribution to global energy governance.
The potential benefits of institutionalised energy cooperation have become even greater during the recent global resources boom. Driven by industrialisation and urbanisation in a range of developing countries, world demand for energy is presently growing fast -with global primary energy consumption increasing 58 per cent during the last decade (Enerdata 2012 ). However, owing to the economics of the energy industry, where investments have long lead times in the order of five to ten years, global supply has failed to keep pace with demand. World energy prices began an upward climb in the mid-2000s, and by 2012 coal, natural gas and crude oil prices had all roughly quadrupled on their levels a decade earlier (Figure 1 ). Energy markets have also become highly volatile, particularly between 2007 and 2011 when a rapid tripling of world oil prices was followed by an abrupt collapse and then a further price surge (Johnson 2011) . While such high growth rates are unlikely to continue indefinitely, the International Energy Agency currently forecasts a further 40% increase in global primary energy consumption by 2035, driven largely by ongoing industrialisation in China and India (IEA 2011: 69) . governance been so pressing.
Indeed, the global resource boom has called forth a rapid expansion in the number of multilateral organisations dedicated to energy issues. Historically, there have been very few multilateral energy organisations in the world economy. The last global resource boom of 1960s and 1970s saw the formation of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (a producer cartel aimed at fixing world oil prices) and the International Energy Agency (a consumer club dedicated to managing oil supply disruptions). However, following the 'resource bust' of the 1980s world energy markets stabilised, and institutional development crawled to a standstill (Colgan et al. 2012) . Recent years, however, have seen a renewed interest in energy institution-building. Three new organisations dedicated solely to energy issues have been established (the International Energy Forum, Energy Charter Treaty and Gas Exporting Countries Forum); and another four multilateral bodies have elected to put energy cooperation on their agendas for the first time (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, the East Asia Summit, and the Groups of Eight and Twenty). At present, some ten global-level organisations now claim energy cooperation as one of their major (if not primary) goals (see Table 2 ), in addition to comparable efforts from a wide range of regional bodies 1 . In quantitative terms, the supply of multilateral energy organisations has never been higher.
The quality of these organisations, however, leaves much to be desired. With few exceptions, they have poorly developed institutional processes, almost never formalise rules for national policies, and in some cases have not even managed to broker agreement on principles for cooperation. They tend to emphasise informal processes, voluntary adherence to vaguely-defined principles, and an aversion to negotiating formalised or specific policy commitments. These characteristics are symptomatic of what can be labelled a 'soft law' approach to institution-building , and limit the extent to which the organisations lock-in cooperative behaviour. As a result, multilateral organisations have attracted considerable criticism for their weak contribution to global energy governance. Harks (2010: 248) has identified an energy ‚vacuum‛ in international organisations; Dubash and Florini (2011: 6) 
EXPLAINING THE FEATURES OF MULTILATERAL ENERGY ORGANISATIONS
Explaining the features of multilateral energy organisations requires theorising differences in the design of international economic institutions. Amongst theories of international regimes, a wide range of terms are used to measure the 'quality' of international organisations -such as the concepts of formality (Koremenos et al. 2001) , legalisation and the degree to which they embody hard or soft law . Despite their subtle conceptual differences, these competing terminologies all refer to the degree to which an organisation develops specific, codified and binding rules for intergovernmental cooperation.
As Ravenhill (2013) suggests, this dimension of institutional development can be conceptualised as a continuum from 'softer' to 'harder' forms of cooperation: . This conceptualises the design of international institutions as involving an autonomy/effectiveness trade-off. As organisations become more institutionalised, the inclusion of formal rules and monitoring systems limit state autonomy in a given policy area, but also make initiatives more robust and likely to lock-in cooperative policy behaviour.
Why do multilateral energy organisations tend to cluster towards the soft law end of the institutional spectrum? It can be argued that the key explanatory factor is the distinct political economy features of energy industries. Energy is somewhat unique amongst forms of economic interdependence because many governments consider it a securitised domain of economic policy. Securitisation is the process by which a political group (in the case of government policy, typically policymaking elites) discursively frame an issue as an existential threat to political order, which demands and legitimises the deployment of 'exceptional' responses (Buzan et al. 1998; Williams 2003) . In the context of economic policy, securitised economic issues become a 'quasi-reserved domain' in which the established rules and practices for policymaking are suspended, and economic logics are subsumed to security concerns (Higgott 2004) . The implication of a government (or group of governments) securitising an issue is that it allows for the imposition of policy measures that go beyond standard practices considered normal for that issue area (Emmers 2003) .
While the securitisation process is conditioned by the subjective perceptions of political actors (William 2003) , there are a range of political economy features that lead governments to securitise energy issues. For some governments, energy is considered an important component of their economic security, particularly import-dependent consumers (such as the EU, US, Japan and China) whose economies would be very adversely affected by either rapid price rises or a suspension of supplies (Wilson 2014; Yergin 2006) . Energy may also be included in broader concerns regarding national security and geopolitical strategy -for example, its inclusion in the Japanese concept of 'comprehensive security' (Ravenhill 2013) , and Russia's recent use of energy diplomacy in its dealings with Europe and Asia (Rutland 2008) . Energy also cuts to issues of regime security in many countries. This includes both the so-called 'rentier states' that almost wholly depend on energy exploitation (such as those in the Middle East and Central Asia) (Schwarz 2008; Franke et al. 2009 ), as well as developing countries whose governments rely on resource rents to finance national developmental strategies (Mares 2010; Pomfret 2011) . But regardless of what type of security is at stake, these patterns of securitisation mean many governments consider energy issues to be of especially high importance to state interests, thus warranting special and extraordinary policy measures. This marks energy off from many other economic sectors, where state interests are not explicitly linked to such a diverse array of security concerns.
The 'extraordinary measures' that have resulted from securitisation are economic nationalist energy policy regimes. On the producer side, this takes the form of 'resource nationalism', where governments intervene through trade and investment controls to ensure state control over energy sectors (Vivoda 2009; Mares 2010) . Resource nationalism is widespread amongst the world's major energy producers. The Gulf States -who produce one-fifth of the world's oil -tightly control their energy sectors through state ownership and applying governmental export controls to facilitate participation in the OPEC oil cartel (Marcel 2006 ). Russia, a major oil and gas supplier to Western and Central Europe, also exercises close supervision of its energy sectors via state ownership of export pipeline infrastructure (Rutland 2008 ). Many energy producers in the developing world -including Brazil (oil), Indonesia (gas), India ( However, economic nationalism is not limited to energy producers. On the consumer side, many governments deploy mercantilistic strategies to safeguard their energy security.
These strategies aim to improve a country's energy security by having national firms own energy projects at production sites abroad, and involve policies which eschew the use of international markets in favour of preferentially-negotiated trade and investment ties with key suppliers (Wilson 2014) . Energy mercantilism is presently on the rise in the global economy. Much attention has recently been paid to China's diplomatic and investment efforts in Africa and Central Asia, which some analysts fear will lead to China 'locking up' global cooperative efforts towards informal arrangements at the soft-law end of the institutional spectrum. In short, the relatively weak contribution of multilateral organisations to global energy governance is explained by the securitised nature of energy issues and nationalistic energy policy regimes associated with it.
The remainder of this article develops and substantiates this argument. The subsequent section provides a detailed survey of ten multilateral energy organisations, documenting the landscape of energy cooperation in the world economy today. This survey identifies that these organisation suffer from one of three challenges -to do with membership, design or commitment issues -which limit their ability to advance shared energy interests prioritised by the participating governments. The final section then explores how the political economy features of energy have conditioned the recent development of these organisations, connecting patterns of securitisation and economic nationalism to state preferences for institutional designs focussed on low-cost and informal (rather than hard law) forms of energy cooperation.
THE CONTEMPORARY LANDSCAPE OF MULTILATERAL ENERGY COOPERATION
In comparison to international organisations in many other domains of the world economy, multilateral energy organisations are largely ineffective at facilitating intergovernmental cooperation. However, variations in the design, scope and membership of these organisations mean they have proven ineffective in markedly different ways. Surveying the ten multilateral energy organisations operating at the global level today, not one but three distinct challenges can be diagnosed (Table 2 ). These organisations either suffer from membership issues that limit their relevance in global energy markets, design issues that proscribe their ability to proceed beyond dialogue activities, or commitment issues whereby states have proved reluctant to agree to cooperation initiatives that circumscribe policy autonomy.
MEMBERSHIP ISSUES
A first set of challenges affects energy organisations which are plagued by membership issues.
Three bodies suffer from this problem: the International Energy Agency, the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries, and the Energy Charter Treaty. These are all formal and well-institutionalised treaty organisations, which explicitly aim to stabilise world markets and/or promote market integration through energy policy liberalisation. However, narrow membership limits these organisations to a small segment of their respective world markets, and as a consequence their ability to act as energy market stabilisers is presently weak. Their difficulties in building membership are closely related to their highly formalised nature, which has acted as an obstacle to bringing in new members who are highly covetous of their energy policy autonomy.
The Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) is the oldest, and perhaps most scrutinised, international energy organisation. Established in 1960, its membership is potentially open to all net oil exporters, and its current twelve members control 41 per cent of the world oil market. OPEC is a treaty-based cartel that obligates its members to coordinate output using production quotas, in order to ensure ‚fair and stable" international oil prices (OPEC 1960) . Though infamous for its role in the twin oil shocks of the 1970s, during the 2000s OPEC has taken on a new role as a 'collaborative manager' of energy markets. In order to mitigate the internecine effects of oil market volatility, OPEC has begun working with consumers -in particular the IEA -to stabilise prices by adjusting output levels in response to price movements (Goldthau & Witte 2011: 36-37 ).
However, the effectiveness of the OPEC cartel has deteriorated significantly in recent years. Since the 1970s, new entrants to the oil industry have diminished OPEC's share of the global market, and its members' lack of spare production capacity mean its ability to stabilise world prices by adjusting output is presently limited (Bremond et al. 2012; Radetski 2012) . Brazil and Canada -which will bring a range of new players into the world market. OPEC's ability to stabilise oil markets is demonstrably limited, and unless its membership can be expanded to new oil producers will further decline in coming years.
The history of the International Energy Agency (IEA) is intimately bound up with OPEC. The IEA was formed in 1974 by a group of OECD governments to resist the market power of the OPEC cartel. Its original remit therefore focused on oil supply crises, specifically through its 1979 Common Emergency Response Mechanism which bound members to share oil stocks in defined situations of supply disruptions (Scott 1994: 123-132) . But following the negotiation of its Shared Goals for Energy Policy in 1993 (IEA 1993 , the IEA increasingly became a negotiating forum for broader energy policy cooperation amongst OECD countries.
Since this time, it has exercised considerable policy influence through its regular market research and policy peer review processes, and has been highly effective in brokering consensus for energy market liberalisation amongst its members (Kohl 2010) . However, these programs only involve dialogue and information sharing activities (rather than the full suite of membership commitments), and for the IEA to maintain its declining relevance deeper patterns of cooperation will need to be established with these new partners In sum, the IEA, OPEC and the ECT are well-institutionalised treaty organisations, which simply need more members to ensure they can effectively stabilise and/or integrate world energy markets. Indeed, all three are presently engaged in some form of outreach or membership drive to remedy this problem. However, the prospects for these initiatives are fairly poor, in large part due to the reluctance of new energy players to cede policy autonomy to hard-law type organisations. OPEC has extended membership invitations to the emerging oil exporters of Russia and Brazil, but both governments have formally refused as membership would involve losing policy autonomy over their economically and geopolitically important oil industries (Goldthau & Witte 2011) . For the ECT, a decade of efforts to secure Russian ratification collapsed in 2009 when the Russian government formally withdrew from the ECT accession process, primarily because of an unwillingness to cede energy policy sovereignty (Kazantsev & Sakwa 2012) .
For the IEA, formal expansion has proven even more difficult, as institutional rules mandate that all members must also belong to the OECD. While this rule historically helped ensure a broad consensus behind energy market liberalisation, it also locks the new energy players of China, India, Russia and Brazil out of IEA membership. Moreover, an 'ideological divide' between the pro-liberalisation IEA states and the nationalist energy policy preferences of these potential new members mean their accession would be highly unlikely, even if IEA membership rules were relaxed in the future (Bochkarev & Austin 2007) . Thus, the strength of these organisations is also paradoxically their primary weakness -hard law approaches to cooperation secure organisational coherence, but at the cost of preventing sovereignty conscious states from joining. By restricting membership, formal rules ultimately weaken their effectiveness in stabilising and integrating world energy markets.
DESIGN ISSUES
A distinct set of problems limit the performance of four multilateral energy organisations affected by design issues: the International Energy Forum, the Gas Exporting Countries Forum, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation and the East Asia Summit 3 . These organisations sit at the opposite end of the institutional spectrum from the membership-limited bodies. They have broad and open memberships, which facilitates high-level intergovernmental dialogues between all major energy producing and consuming states. However, to achieve these broad memberships very informal organisational designs have been required. None of these organisations have a purposive agenda, consensus behind well-defined policy principles, or in some cases even a fixed membership list. Their primary role is as 'energy talkshops', and while they perform useful information sharing and dialogue functions are designed in such a way as to explicitly rule out any other forms of cooperation.
The last decade has seen the emergence of two new multilateral organisations dedicated to energy issues -the International Energy Forum (IEF) and the Gas Exporting
Countries Forum (GECF). Initially convened in 1991 (but officially formalised in 2003), the IEF is a biennial summit meeting dedicated to fostering producer-consumer energy dialogue, whose most recent summit in 2012 was attended by eighty-nine national delegations (IEF 2012a). The GECF was established in 2001 as a body to promote common policies amongst gas exporters, and its eleven members currently hold 70 per cent of proven world gas reserves (GECF 2012a). Their primary functions are dialogue activities: convening annual or biennial ministerial summits, hosting a series of technical and policy dialogues between national energy bureaucracies, and in the case of the IEF operating a business forum which runs parallel to ministerial meetings. Both ministerial summits conclude with the issuing of a collective statement, which spells out directions for cooperation and policy reform agreed by consensus amongst participants. The main strength of these bodies is their broad membership: IEF members account for over 90 per cent of world energy trade (Table 2) , and while the GECF controls only a third of the current global gas trade its members are poised to gain the lion's share of this nascent export industry as it expands over the coming decade.
However, because they have not moved beyond the most basic of dialogue functions, the IEF and GECF currently do little to realise shared interests in energy. Neither body has agreed to a well-defined set of policy principles; their ministerial statements are generally aspirational and limited to vague calls for future cooperation . A major strength of these organisations is their broad and relatively representative memberships, which include a mix of both the world's major energy consumers (Japan, Korea, China and the US) and producers (Australia, Russia, Indonesia, and Canada).
However, few concrete outputs have come from the APEC or EAS processes either.
Both organisations' agreed principles for energy cooperation are extremely vague -outlining desired collective outcomes (predominantly market liberalisation and energy efficiency measures), but leaving the steps required to achieve them under-or un-specified producers, who successfully claimed that nationalistic policies were a legitimate and justifiable policy tool to promote economic development (Latina et al. 2011: 8) . This situation appears unlikely to change, as energy issues are not currently part of the WTO Secretariat's work program, and are unlikely to be added to the agenda for the (already fraught) ongoing Doha round.
Similar commitment problems have occurred in energy dialogues within the Group of Eight (G8) and Group of Twenty (G20). Energy cooperation initiatives which were added to the G8 agenda during the 2005 Gleaneagles Summit, and have featured in every G20 Leaders and a significant number of the two summits' recent declarations have included specific policy commitments. Managing the transition from hydrocarbons to new energy sources has been a particularly focus, and agreements to promote energy efficiency, renewables and national energy planning repeatedly feature in their declarations. However, this impressive declaratory record hides serious practical shortcomings.
First, the G8 and G20 summits have cherry-picked easy and low controversy issues for attention. All but two of their commitments focus on energy efficiency measures which, as Van de Graaf and Westphal (2011: 28-29) point out, member states were already in the process of implementing. Second, some of their commitments have been so vaguely worded as to have little practical value. The G20's 2009 agreement to phase out 'inefficient' fuel subsidies suffered from this difficultly, as it allowed states to self-determine whether their fuel subsidies were inefficient or not 11 . Third, even their specific commitments are officially labelled non-binding, and compliance studies conducted by the G8 Information Centre demonstrate that the implementation record is at best mixed. Governments have been reasonably responsive in implementing the (easy) energy efficiency measures, but more demanding initiatives (such as formulating national energy plans and reducing trade barriers) have suffered from weak compliance records (G8 Information Centre 2012). Thus, while energy cooperation efforts in the G8 and G20 seem well-institutionalised, they are also either vaguely defined, or suffer from poor compliance records.
Why are the WTO, G8 and G20 all struggling to move toward more institutionalised forms of energy cooperation? It is certainly not due to the design of the organisations themselves: the WTO has proven highly successful in developing formalised, hard-law type trade rules (Jackson 2008) ; and the G8/G20 summit processes have managed to facilitate a degree of fiscal and monetary coordination during the recent global financial crisis (Cooper 2010) . Rather, the answer lies in issues of sovereignty and nationalism unique to energy sectors. In the WTO, negotiation deadlocks between sovereignty-covetous producers and proliberalisation consumers have consistently seen efforts to close the energy gaps in the GATT fail (Selivanova 2007: 34) . The G-summits have been plagued by similar internal divisions, which pit western consumers favouring liberalisation against a group of nationalistic suppliers unwilling to relinquish governmental control: Russia in the G8 (Lesage et al. 2009 ), and a constellation of resource nationalists (China, Saudi Arabia, Brazil, Russia and South Africa) in the G20 (Van de Graaf & Westphal 2011) . These internal divisions between the interests of pro-liberalisation consumers and nationalistic producers have prevented these organisations from progressing cooperative initiatives as far in energy as they have in other domains. The result has either been the explicit vetoing of energy cooperation proposals (the WTO), or the blocking of meaningful proposals being made in the first place (the G8/G20).
ENERGY SECURITISATION AND THE LIMITS TO MULTILATERAL COOPERATION
As this survey has demonstrated, the practical contribution of multilateral organisations to global energy governance is limited. Despite the presence of ten organisations concerned in some way with energy, no global body effectively and reliably institutionalises patterns of intergovernmental cooperation. Nonetheless, these organisations all sit at different points on the institutional spectrum, have pursued different shared energy interests, and face differing challenges (summarised below in Table 2 ). Some are relatively well-institutionalised but have membership limitations; some are talkshops by design, useful for information sharing but little else; while others have failed to live up to their potential in the energy sphere due to commitment issues. Despite shared interests in integrating world energy markets, addressing volatility, and managing the transition to new energy sources, no multilateral organisation effectively realises any of these goals. When reading across these organisational stories, what factors can be divined as the root cause behind the absence of effective and well-developed energy organisations? Why has energy proven so resistant to multilateral cooperation? There is a demonstrable connection between patterns of energy cooperation and the political economy features of energy. The various limitations faced by these organisations can all be traced to the fact energy is a securitised economic issue, and many players in energy markets consequently maintain economic nationalist energy policy regimes. These dynamics raise states concerns over policy autonomy, prohibit forms of cooperation based on liberalisation, and result in cooperative efforts being channelled towards low-cost (but low impact) dialogue and information sharing activities. The membership, design and commitment issues faced by multilateral energy organisations can all be traced to securitisation and economic nationalism in the energy sphere.
The securitised nature of energy is an important explanatory factor behind membership patterns in energy organisations. As energy is an integral element of economic, Nationalistic energy policies also account for why many of these organisations have been purposefully designed along soft law lines. The energy policies of many major players -including China, Russia, the Gulf States and most countries in Latin America -are nationalistic, inward-looking, and antithetical to all but the lowest-cost forms of energy cooperation (Herberg 2010; Vivoda 2009 ). As a consequence, the broad-membership organisations to which these governments belong -such as the IEF, GECF and G20 -have not developed any cooperative principles. In other organisations, such as APEC and the EAS, the presence of nationalistic energy producers has been accommodated by designing vague principle statements that encourage, but do not require, energy policy reforms. Indeed, the only bodies to develop strong and specific cooperative principles are the IEA and ECT
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, which are almost wholly comprised of western consumer governments and count few energy nationalists amongst their members. Economic nationalism has inhibited even the development of cooperative principles, and made soft law a necessary condition for participation in multilateral energy organisations.
Thus, the evidence surveyed here demonstrates that weak energy cooperation is causally linked to patterns of securitisation and economic nationalism. To put the argument theoretically: the political economy features of energy mean many states perceive the sovereignty costs of hard-law energy cooperation as greater than its potential benefits. The result has not been a lack of cooperation entirely, but rather a preference for soft law approaches and the dominance of informal institutional designs. Energy organisations using soft law approaches have grown rapidly, while those engaged in hard law cooperation have struggled either to attract members or to ensure compliance with agreed initiatives. , which will reduce their capacity to lock governments into substantive policy reforms. While the four design-limited bodies perform important dialogue functions, the participants have little appetite to develop them beyond a talkshop role due to concerns over policy autonomy. Problems in the commitment-limited organisations will also prove intractable, as there is little potential to advance liberalisation while nationalistic policy regimes are maintained by key players such as Russia, Brazil and China. To put it bluntly, the performance of multilateral energy organisations is as good as it is likely to get in their current political and economic context.
To be sure, this analysis should not necessarily be read as a wholesale condemnation of multilateral energy organisations. During the global resource boom, several multilateral initiatives have been highly successful in fostering policy dialogues and information sharing, and global energy governance is certainly the better for it. As advocates of soft law approaches such as argue, these organisations are helping build confidence between the key players in world energy markets, and have allowed dialogic cooperation that would have been impossible had hard law designs been insisted upon.
However, the informal nature of these organisations means they have not helped governments realise shared energy interests such as integrating energy markets, addressing market volatility or managing energy transitions. Whatever dialogic benefits institutionalised cooperation may potentially offer, the securitised nature of energy issues means that multilateral organisations have not made a major contribution to global energy governance, and are unlikely to in coming years.
